INTO THE EYE OF THE COMMANDER: MILITARY ADVISORY DURING CONFLICT
Neither honour, nor patriotism, nor generous superstition, could animate the lifeless bodies of slaves and strangers, who had succeeded to the honours of the legions…A reformer should be exempt from the suspicion of interest, and he must possess the confidence and esteem of those who he proposes to reclaim.
-Sir Edward Gibbon
Conflict termination is one of the most complex aspects of war and also generates the most far reaching effects. As a nation achieves its military end state by imposing its will upon the adversary, the greater problem of turning a military success into a strategic victory arises. 2 This becomes readily apparent in the immediate and urgent need to provide security for the civilian population in occupied territories as the key factor toward stability in the aftermath of conflict. To advance our national interests, the United States has proclaimed it will commit military forces only -in a way that reflects our values and strengthens our legitimacy…‖ 3 Fundamentally, nation-states have attempted to wager ways, means, and ends in order to advance their relative positions of power and influence among the international community-ratcheted by their willingness to hedge risk in order to achieve their aims. 4 Commanders then translate this type of strategic guidance into their operational approach, a concept that US joint doctrine describes as a -visualization of how military operations should transform the current conditions into the desired conditions at end state.‖ 5 As we enter the 21 st Century, where post-colonialism, religious fundamentalism, and resurgent nationalism have erupted across the globe, American troops are seen less as liberators and increasingly as unwanted, occupying forces. This development has posed added difficulties for the United States to achieve stabilization in various regions. With operational approach in mind-and in light of this change of the perception of American troops-one of the critical programs that the United States has endeavored to leverage toward conflict termination is the training and advising of foreign military forces. This enterprise has grown in scale and scope and has proven to be pivotal to achieve a strategic victory. -Advising has evolved from ill-organized military mercenary units to professional, government-sponsored teams oftentimes driven by a desire to cultivate political and economic influence.‖ 6 Indeed, the purpose of advising and training efforts spans the gamut of such purposes as nation-building, modernization, strategic engagement, ideological penetration, counterinsurgency, and even profiteering. Ultimately, the United States seeks to enhance the military capabilities of our allies, friends, and partners in order to underwrite collective security in regions of vital interest.
Despite numerous language, cultural, funding, and organizational challenges, US Forces have historically prepared foreign national forces with aplomb, but have in some cases fallen short of our stated aims. The US experience in three conflicts-the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and Operation Iraqi Freedom-underscores many of these successes and shortcomings. These conceptual and historical analyses will provide a backdrop against which I shall determine if the United States has provided the necessary training, preparation, and guidance for our servicemen to succeed in this pivotal effort. While US Commanders have sometimes included this effort into their operational approach, it is vital to securing a successful conflict termination.
Development of the Republic of Korea Army (ROKA)
In the aftermath of the Japanese surrender in September of 1945, both the 12 Almost immediately, the Americans found themselves tackling not only training and organization, but other missions to include nation-building and counter-insurgency. 13 Coupled with this was the total lack of American familiarity with
Asian cultures in general, and to the Koreans in particular.
By any measure, Korea was a tough assignment. Considering the extra burden of being the only American living and working with Koreans without any linguistic or cultural preparation, little material support, and a motivated but demanding boss, it is amazing that so many advisors not only were successful, but even thrived in this most challenging environment.
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The Koreans emulated every aspect of their American instructors, and struggled through the numerous language and cultural differences. Basic military doctrinal terms and concepts such as ‗machine gun' or ‗phase line' had no natural equivalent in the Korean language and thus had to be improvised-and often not in a standardized way. 15 Oriental pride or ‗face' greatly complicated the advisor's role. Americans soon discovered that correcting or even suggesting alternate techniques to a Korean officer or NCO in front of his troops resulted in that leader's public humiliation. 16 The American advisors recruited Korean officers from the very limited pool of war veterans. In some cases, these Koreans had fought each other while serving in the Chinese and Japanese armies, respectively. Similarly, in the newly formed ROKA, even those with combat experience had to unlearn the parade-like precision of IJA drills and adopt the innovative-and often unwieldy-American practice of fire and maneuver. 17 Slowly, but methodically, the ROKA learned and then adopted American-style heavy weapons tactics and even squad through battalion level maneuvers by March 1950. 18 Thus on the eve of hostilities, the ROKA was progressing well, but was still far from a battle-worthy force. First, the ROKA struggled with manning issues; although the 29 Incrementally, and under the baptism of fire, the ROKA began to gain proficiency. By 1952, the ROKA had made up for shortages in firepower with a penchant for closing with the enemy; they counterattacked with stubborn resolve, repeatedly throwing the CCF back time and time again. 30 The new chief of US advisors, MG Cornelius Ryan, oversaw a massive expansion of the ROKA training base, to include eighteen separate installations to house officer professional schools, branch schools, and NCOES. 31 In May 1953, Van
Fleet planned a ROKA offensive along the east coast to complement his own Eighth
Army attack in the west; the ROKA was partly successful, slowing in the tough mountainous terrain. 32 Despite the Chinese propensity to target the South Korean units during attacks, the ROKA staved off the final full-fledged CCF offensive in July 1953. 33 Ultimately, it was this very hardening and proficiency of the ROKA that convinced the Communist Chinese to agree to the terms of the Armistice in July 1953. training centers, and hospital care for disabled veterans. 35 Third, the selection of leaders continued to be a long-term problem. Following the custom of many imperfect democracies, the ROK Government combined political preferment with military preferment. -The politicians in primitive societies want no generals they cannot trust.
They prefer a politically reliable man at the head of a division to a competent one who may happen to belong to the wrong family.‖ 36 Family is germane to one's position in a
Confucian society. Therefore, this selection of officers is something the ROKA has grappled with until fully adopting a promotion meritocracy in the 1990s. Fourth, an effective working relationship between South Korean President Syngman Rhee, US Ambassador John Muccio, and Generals MacArthur and later Ridgway provided an executive forum to discuss the needs and performance of the ROKA. 37 In abundance, the American advisors, despite an environment of poverty, corruption, insurrection, and isolation, helped to develop an effective fighting force that had to contend with sedition, rebellion, and invasion. It is a great testimony to both the Korean soldiers and their US advisors that the ROKA performed so well in the most trying conditions. While this conflict is technically still afoot, the US advisory mission to the ROKA has played a significant part to the cessation of hostilities, working toward conflict resolution.
Misfire with the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN)
Originally supporting our French Ally in her quest to maintain overseas colonies, 38 This time, the communist aggression was not as acute, nor was the commencement of hostilities quite as pronounced. In sharp contrast to the high-intensity conflict that erupted in Korea, the Viet Cong instead prosecuted an insurgency designed to erode and incrementally seize power in South Vietnam. In this struggle, the communists sought to mobilize the peasantry, create an anti-imperialist liberation front, cache munitions and supplies, train in sanctuaries, and select the times and locations of contact. 39 Although the United
States policy in Vietnam morphed several times during our years of involvement, the one overriding tocsin that rang true for the entire duration was that of containment. 40 As President John F. Kennedy took office in January 1961, these insurgencies in Laos and South Vietnam had begun to take an ominous turn. Fearing both nuclear and conventional parity with the Soviet Union, Kennedy identified counterinsurgency as an arena for the United States to gain an edge. 41 The President dispatched Professor Walt Whitman Rostow and General Maxwell Taylor to South Vietnam to assess conditions on the ground; they returned and recommended a significant expansion of American involvement, particularly in the area of military advisors. 42 In response, the Kennedy Administration accelerated the American-sponsored counterinsurgency campaign. 43 President Kennedy more than tripled the number of military advisors from 900 to over 3000 and approved clandestine operations in Laos and North Vietnam. He -decided that he had no choice but to make Southeast Asia the place where he would prove that ‗wars of national liberation' could no longer be won,‖ setting an example for countries in Africa and South America as well. 44 In short, the President envisioned the United States Meanwhile, although the ARVN had learned the French reliance of defensive warfare, reaction in a tactical environment, and caution with insurgents, their American advisors now began to speak of different tactics and a different way to think about warfare. 46 The Americans -…emphasized combat, set-piece battles between organized units as the centrality of conflict. Americans also put a high priority upon the use of firepower and high mobility, both controlled by a sophisticated communications system, as a means of assuring that decisive combat is achieved in the field.‖ 47 The US Army, searching for continued relevancy in a nuclear-dominated strategic landscape, was quick to demonstrate that conventional limited wars along the periphery maintained significance; somewhere lost in this organizational objective is the fact that the Army (and the Marine Corps) had underdeveloped, outdated, and oversimplified counterinsurgency doctrine. 48 Thus, by placing organizational objectives ahead of political guidance, the US Army prepared our Ally for a kind of war neither envisioned by US political leaders, nor predicted by the intelligence community. 55 The Vietnamese learned readily from their American advisors.
Although extremely proficient in the care and repair of weapon systems and equipment, the ARVN struggled with coordinating fire support and air, often relying on their US advisors to perform these duties. 56 The US advisors to the incipient South Vietnamese
Air Force fared no better. Many spoke derogatorily of their counterparts and, even worse, treated them like impoverished children. Likewise, the Americans displayed a chronic impatience in obtaining results, which in many cases led to a self-fulfilling prophecy of failure on the part of the ARVN. 57 Ultimately, the reports written by these advisors led US higher commanders to dismiss the possibilities of relying on the ARVN to accept a greater responsibility for defeating the communists. US advisors had to likewise struggle against the oligarchy and especially with the rampant corruption. South Vietnamese government officials gouged bribes for driver licenses, passports, visas, and work permits; they also extorted kickbacks for contracts to build and service facilities in support of the ARVN. 69 Coupled with these cultural persuasively that this is simply not so. 88 Others, like General Roy Doughty, contend that the US prepared the ARVN for the wrong kind of war, focusing too much too early on conventional and too little too late on counterinsurgency. 89 Larry Cable contends that training a foreign force while in contact with the enemy is risky:
No one appeared to question the possibility of training an army that was also engaged in constant combat operations. The United States should have learned this in Greece or Korea where the attempt to train and fight simultaneously almost lost the war for the government forces. 90 Still others, most notably George Herring, contend that the US missed the importance of the village in the fabric of Vietnamese life. 91 In any event, despite the great efforts of the US advisors and the heroic actions of the ARVN, we misfired on the training of this force to prepare it to protect its nation or to secure successful conflict termination. 96 In a similar fashion, Shi'ia militia and Kurdish separatist groups rapidly emerged. Concurrently, a whole myriad of groups-ranging from pan-Islamists to criminals, from mercenaries to nationalists-violently opposed the US presence. Soon, these disparate irregular forces created an insurgency that spawned sectarian violence, something for which the US forces and their coalition partners had not prepared. 97 Still, the US pressed forward by disbanding the Iraqi Army and removing any loyal Saddam Iraqis from high positions in public works and government. 98 Sadly, this refutes the lessons learned in post-WWII Germany, where General Eisenhower adopted a ‗bottom up' approach of deNazification to keep society functioning. 99 With the rapid de-Ba'athification of all aspects of Iraqi society, the situation eroded into chaos, looting, and general lawlessness. In a new development, the Americans have also begun to turn increasingly to private corporations to train the ISF. Under this construct, the Americans have taken a quasi-military approach, with US Servicemen doing the advising and contractors conducting the training. 119 The exigency for this was the dissolution of the old Iraqi Army and the resulting rush to man, equip, and train the new ISF to fill the vacuum as US forces battled the insurgents. 120 Subjecting US Foreign Policy to much international scrutiny for employing ‗mercenaries,' this reliance on contractors also removes military expertise from the realm of Congressional oversight and public accountability. 121 However, it also provided a much needed economy of force in the train and advise mission in order to allow surge units to destroy or capture insurgents. 
A Reckoning
The United States certainly has not undercut the tremendous responsibilities and broad range of tasks when training and advising foreign military forces during conflict.
All three of these conflicts demonstrate the eagerness of the American Serviceman to enhance and professionalize the capabilities of his allies. Enduring the same hardships, travails, dangers, and privations, the US advisor has dealt with a myriad of frustration, misunderstanding, and oftentimes, corruption.
Recurring themes for US advisors include language and cultural difficulties, lack of a common procurement methodology, and delays or subservience of the advisory mission until regular US forces complete the fight against the enemy. Additionally, while the US correctly identified the icon of culture in Korea and Iraq-the family and the tribe, respectively-we failed to understand the importance of the village in Vietnamese society until it was too late. Likewise, the theater commander's approach has created a marked imprint on the course of the advise and train mission. The US failed to employ any sort of independent or external evaluation to gauge the foreign units it has trained.
While US regular forces from all services undergo periodic external evaluationsparticularly before deployments-this same scrutiny seems devoid for foreign forces under US tutelage.
Following such a survey, several conclusions become clear. First, US advisors require specific training in language, culture, and customs. Relationships with the supported force are critical to accepting the advisor's recommendations. Second, advisors must understand the theater commander's approach. This allows for clear guidance and greater understanding between the advisor and the supported force.
Third, the advise and train mission as a whole benefits from close relations between US political and military leaders with the head of state of the host nation. These recommendations would better posture US advisors for success in this vital mission, and are echoed in the Army and Marine Corps' latest counterinsurgency manual. 125 In this way, US advisors can attain the accord as described in the quote from Sir Edward
Gibbon that began this research paper.
As the US continues to prosecute the war in Afghanistan and prepare for future conflicts, the training of foreign military forces will endure as a central line of operation.
That we will continue to allocate personnel, resources, time, and energy into this endeavor is beyond question. US commanders must incorporate this endeavor into their operational approach to achieve their desired end state. The challenge for US forces will be to increase our collective awareness of the strains and stresses-and to get this mission into the eye of the commander-in order to successfully resolve conflicts and gain a better peace.
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